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Abstract: Can we provide legislative drafters with tools to simplify and clarify legislation, and 
make it more accessible? In the UK, USA, Canada, Australia and EU, through 
strategies such as the ‘Plain Language’ and ‘Good Law’ (PL/GL) initiatives, it is 
claimed that the answer is ‘yes’. Though many of the normative intentions underlying 
such initiatives are commendable, we argue that the pursuit of legislative and legal 
simplicity, clarity, and accessibility ignores the distinctly ‘complicated’ and ‘complex’ 
role of legislation and legislative drafters. This leads to a range of contradictory and 
paradoxical outcomes that undermine these goals. Following a review of the role of 
legislative drafters and PL/GL initiatives, we use a complexity tool, the Stacey 
Diagram, to demonstrate and visualise the inherent tensions in the PL/GL position. We 
show how legislative drafters negotiate their complex environment in a much more 
subtle, human way than is commonly recognised in PL/GL discourse. 
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The Drafters’ Dance: the complexity of drafting legislation 
and the limitations of ‘Plain Language’ and ‘Good Law’ 
initiatives 
Thomas E. Webb and Robert Geyer * 
 
Introduction 
The cliché of law’s complexity is long-established.  Yet, the coming of the information age poses new 
challenges for the law, and especially for legislative drafters. One of the principal consequences of this 
change has been an expansion in the range of actors capable of engaging directly with the legislative 
process and its products.1  As the available audience for the direct consumption of statute law has grown, 
so too has the potential for complexity in the legislative process. The dominant response to this growing 
complexity has taken two forms. In Canada, and to a lesser extent the United States (US), the response 
has been to build upon an established official doctrine of plain language drafting.  In other jurisdictions, 
such as Australia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU), systematic engagement 
with plain language drafting principles has only occurred more recently via, for example, the Good Law 
Initiative of the Office of the Parliamentary Council, and the Better Regulation Agenda of the European 
Commission respectively. Although there are local differences in the characteristics of their 
implementation, these responses attempt to manage the burgeoning diversity of the legislative process, 
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Justice 19th Legislative Drafting Conference, Ottawa, 13-14 September 2018.  The authors are grateful for the 
comments of numerous conference delegates.  Unless otherwise stated, the last date of access for all URLs in this 
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1 See R. Heaton, ‘Innovation and continuity in law-making’, Sir William Dale Memorial Lecture on Legislation 




and to limit the range of possible understandings of statutory texts.  In this article, we argue that, 
although the motives for engaging in such activity are founded in important constitutional principles, 
approaching the task in this way misunderstands the nature of the challenge. 
 
While the history of ‘Plain Language’ and ‘Good Law’ (PL/GL) initiatives varies, they each 
express a desire to improve the clarity of the statute book, simplify it, and enhance the accessibility of 
the law.  They work on the assumption that clarifying, simplifying and developing the accessibility of 
legislation will lead to better law, improve individuals’ understanding of the legal system and the 
expectations it places upon them, and in so doing reduce the burden of complying with the law.  As 
Richard Heaton, former First Parliamentary Counsel and Permanent Secretary of the UK Cabinet 
Office, argued, ‘Excessive complexity hinders economic activity, creating burdens for individuals, 
businesses and communities. It obstructs good government. It undermines the rule of law.’2  However, 
despite the presence of these official views and their commendable goals fundamental questions remain: 
1. Is the problem of complexity a new phenomenon? 
2. Are the PL/GL initiatives, responding to this complexity, new? 
3. Is the core problem too much complicatedness and/or complexity? 
4. Are ‘good’ (simplified, clarified and accessible) laws inherently better than ‘bad’ more 
complicated laws? 
5. Is ‘good’ or ‘plain language’ law generally beneficial, or can it be just as political as 
‘bad’ ‘complicated’ law; merely creating different ‘winners’ and ‘losers’? 
In this article we examine these questions by using a complexity perspective to explore the distinctly 
‘complicated’ and ‘complex’ role of legislative drafters and how they relate to PL/GL initiatives. 
Following a short introduction to complexity and the distinctive role of legislative drafters, we briefly 
review and compare recent UK, Canadian, US, Australian and EU initiatives to explore how their 
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approaches interact with the complex nature of legislative and policy processes, and the implications 
for the role of legislative drafters. Next, we examine the three, paradoxically complementary and 
contradictory, core elements of the PL/GL initiatives: clarity, simplicity, and accessibility.  Finally, we 
use a Stacey Diagram,3 a complexity tool for visualising the consequences of complexity, to explore 
the implications of, and tensions generated by, these initiatives for legislative, legal, and policy 
processes. 
 
We conclude, mirroring recent thinking on complexity and pragmatism,4 and the relational 
nature of complexity,5 that legislative complexity and initiatives to manage it are not new; that it is 
important to differentiate between complicatedness and complexity; that complexity is both part of the 
problem and the solution; that ‘clarified’, ‘simplified’ and ‘accessible’ laws can provide short term 
improvements but only if they are viewed as part of a continuous, emergent process; and that PL/GL 
inspired laws can be just as political as those which they replace, particularly when the political 
motivation underpinning them lies in reducing business costs.  Ultimately, we show that the nature of 
the drafters’ dance, how drafters negotiate their complex environment, is a much more subtle and human 
one than is commonly recognised by PL/GL initiatives. Placing too many PL/GL rigidifying constraints 
on the ‘dance’, may do more harm than good. 
 
What do we mean by complexity and how does it relate to law and public 
policy? 
Complexity, a general term covering a wide range of complex, adaptive, emergent systems and 
phenomena, has been extensively deployed in the natural sciences since the 1970s.6 From the 1990s, it 
                                                 
3 R. Stacey, Strategic Management and Organisational Dynamics (London: Prentice Hall 1993). 
4 C. Ansell and R. Geyer ‘“Pragmatic Complexity” a new foundation for moving beyond “evidence based policy 
making”?’ (2017) 28(2) Policy Studies 149. 
5 T.E. Webb, ‘Asylum and complexity: The vulnerable identity of law as a complex system’ in J. Murray, T.E. 
Webb and S. Wheatley (eds) Complexity Theory and Law: Mapping an Emergent Jurisprudence (London: 
Routledge, 2018). 
6 P. Coveney and R. Highfield, Frontiers of complexity: The search for order in a chaotic world (London: Faber 
and Faber 1995). 
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also spread across the social sciences into a wide range of policy areas,7 and has been deployed by a 
number of governments and international organisations.8 However, there is no one theory of 
complexity. It is best thought of as a field, or an approach, with multiple debates over the breadth, 
definition and implications of complexity.9 In consequence, for us, complexity is more of a world view 
than a grand theory, that: 
 
is about connected complex systems, for which the assumptions of average 
types and average interactions are not appropriate and are not made. Such 
systems coevolve with their environment, being “open” to flows of energy, 
matter, and information across whatever boundaries we have chosen to 
define. These flows do not obey simple, fixed laws, but instead result from 
the internal “sense making” going on inside them, as experience, conjectures 
and experiments are used to modify the interpretive frameworks within.10 
From this perspective complexity argues that, at the meta-theoretical level, physical and social reality 
is composed of a wide range of continually interacting, orderly, complex and disorderly phenomena. 
One can focus on different aspects (orderly, complex or disorderly), but that does not mean that the 
others do not exist.  Part of the challenge of complexity is recognising, first, that in order to comment 
upon or model anything, one needs to draw boundaries,11 and secondly, that the construction of those 
                                                 
7 D. Byrne and G. Callaghan, Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences (Oxford: Routledge, 2013); B. Castellani 
and F.W. Hafferty, Sociology and Complexity Science: A new field of inquiry (Berlin Heidelberg: Springer, 2009); 
R. Geyer and S. Rihani, Complexity and public policy: a new approach to 21st century politics, policy and society 
(Oxford: Routledge, 2010); R. Geyer and P. Cairney (eds) Handbook on Complexity and Public Policy 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015). 
8 See Australian Public Service Commission, Tackling Wicked Problems: a public policy perspective (Canberra: 
Australian Public Service Commission, 2007); Department for Education, The Munro Review of Child Protection: 
Final Report, A Child-Centred System Report Cm 8062 (2011); OECD Global Science Forum, Application of 
Complexity Science for Public Policy: New tools for finding unanticipated consequences and unrealized 
opportunities (OECD, September 2009). 
9 D. Byrne, Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2005); E. Morin, 
‘Restricted Complexity, General Complexity’, in C. Gershenson, D. Aerts and B. Edmonds (eds), Worldviews, 
Science and Us: Philosophy and Complexity (New Jersey: World Scientific, 2007), K.A. Richardson and P. 
Cilliers, ‘What is Complexity Science? A view from different directions’ (2001) 3(1) Emergence 5 
10 P. Allen, ‘What is complexity science? Knowledge of the limits of knowledge’ (2001) 3(1) Emergence 24, 39-
40; see also Morin, n 9 above. 
11 P. Cilliers, ‘Why we cannot know complex things completely’ (2002) 4(1&2) Emergence 77, 81-2. 
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boundaries has implications for our understanding.12  Similarly, individual components will themselves 
possess orderly, complex, and disorderly characteristics.  The crucial point is that these complex 
components exist in the presence of other such complex components. They interact with them, and in 
so doing create emergent meanings, and frameworks of understanding through the boundaries and 
identities they formulate to make sense of the world.13  This represents a significant change from more 
reductionist, closed systems approaches, such as Luhmann’s autopoiesis,14 and other modernist 
approaches that tend to focus on the qualities, and knowability of individual types of systems, processes, 
and actors as individual, isolated components.  
 
From a complexity perspective, the process of generating meaning out of interaction is called 
emergence.  Emergence is premised on the idea that all actors, processes, and organisations are able to 
engage in systemic discourse with a view to increasing their own individual understandings of the 
world.  On the one hand, it is not possible to know everything,15 or to create a truly predictive model; 
the informational, quantum and conscious elements of systems make this impossible.16  Yet, on the 
other hand, complex systems acquire knowledge via interaction.  Explanations which make no sense, 
or which deviate from the majority of understandings will struggle to interact without modifying their 
positions.  Such an approach promotes consensus, in that reaching collective, or at least majority, 
understandings around particular concepts is desirable.  In this context it is perfectly reasonable for 
individuals to subscribe to the doctrine of precedent, agree to standard rules of statutory interpretation, 
and recognise the importance of key legal texts, tests and concepts. 
 
                                                 
12 P. Cilliers, ‘Boundaries, Hierarchies and Networks in Complex Systems’ (2001) 5(2) International Journal of 
Innovation Management 135, 140; P. Cilliers, ‘Complexity, Deconstruction and Relativism’ (2005a) 22 Theory, 
Culture, Society 255, 259; T.E. Webb, ‘Exploring System Boundaries’ (2013) 24(2) Law and Critique 131. 
13 P. Cilliers (2001), 141; P. Cilliers, ‘Knowledge, limits and boundaries’ (2005b) 37 Futures 605-613, 610; see 
also Webb ibid. 
14 For example, N. Luhmann, ‘The Unity of The Legal System’ in G. Teubner (ed) Autopoietic Law: A New 
Approach to Law and Society (New York: Walter de Gruyter Publishing, 1988); ‘The Coding of the Legal System’ 
G. Teubner and A. Febbrajo (eds) State, Law, and Economy As Autopoietic Systems: Regulation and Autonomy 
in a New Perspective (Milan: Giuffrè, 1992). 
15 N. Rescher, Complexity: A Philosophical Overview (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1998), xiv-xv.  
16 P. Cilliers, Complexity and Postmodernism (Oxford: Routledge, 1998), 24, 58; Cilliers n 12 above. 
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Complexity theory does not preach chaos nor entail a situation of ‘anything goes’.17  Instead, it 
expects periods of long-running stability punctuated by occasional substantial changes in individual- 
through to system-level contexts. At the same time, complexity theory thinking expects and encourages 
diversity.  New interactions and information represent a continual challenge to existing frameworks. 
Moreover, due to this diversity and novelty, multiple interpretive paradigms can coexist. For example, 
in legal thinking perspectives including positivism and natural law, political and legal constitutionalism, 
formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law all interact and compete with each other.18  This 
interaction and competition forces adaptation and further interaction.  All of this places the capacity for 
change more in the hands of individual actors, in that they can contribute towards consensus and offer 
new perspectives to accommodate novelty.   
 
In regards to policy, complexity is seen as a rejection of the traditional modernist world view 
of order, causality, reductionism, predictability and determinism that marks the foundation of the more 
extreme versions of New Public Management (NPM) and Evidence-Based Policy Making (EBPM).19 
It is, ‘a way of thinking … which can help guide inquiries into the workings of complex social systems 
… but not … verify laws and law-like generalizations’.20  Similarly, for law the recognition that legal 
systems possess the characteristics of complex systems – multiple actors and institutions interacting in 
emergent ways– is relatively recent, but has grown rapidly across a range of areas including social 
welfare, taxation, regulation, constitutional, and international law.21  
 
                                                 
17 Cilliers 1998 ibid, viii; see also P. Cilliers, ‘Postmodern Knowledge and Complexity (or why anything does not 
go)’ (1995) 14(3) South African Journal of Philosophy 124. 
18 See B. Mauthe and T.E. Webb, ‘In the multiverse what is real?: Luhmann, complexity and ANT’ in A. La Cour 
and A. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (eds) Luhmann Observed: Radical Theoretical Encounters Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2013).  
19 R. Geyer, ‘Can complexity move UK policy beyond 'evidence-based policy making' and the 'audit culture? 
Applying a 'complexity cascade' to education and health policy’ (2012) 60 (1) Political Studies 20. 
20 G. Morçöl, A Complexity Theory for Public Policy (London: Routledge, 2012), 266. 
21 For examples and overviews see N. Harris, Law in a Complex State: Complexity in the Law and Structure of 
Welfare (Oxford: Hart, 2013);  J. Murray, T.E. Webb, S. Wheatley (eds) Complexity Theory and Law: Mapping 
an Emergent Jurisprudence (London: Routledge, 2018); JB. Ruhl, ‘Law’s Complexity: A Primer’ (2008) 24(4) 
Georgia State University Law Review 885; JB. Ruhl and D.M. Katz, ‘Measuring, Monitoring and Managing Legal 
Complexity’ (2017) 101 Iowa Law Review 191; T.E. Webb, ‘Tracing an Outline of Legal Complexity’ (2014) 




There are a number of important implications for our approach to understanding and living with 
the complexity of the policy and legal spheres, and social life more generally.  First, we must recognise 
the shift in our view of the nature of social life entailed by complexity. Legal and policy actors must 
take a reflexive, flexible approach to the orderly and disorderly foundations of all phenomena. In 
acknowledgement of this, complexity approaches legal and political systems as fundamentally non-
linear, where scale and the nature of cause and effect are not directly related to one another.22  This does 
not excuse individuals for the consequences of their actions, far from it.  Rather than being able to blame 
bad data, poor implementation or unforeseen consequences, which implies that a policy or legal 
intervention would have worked but for errors and misunderstandings, the legislator, the policy-maker, 
and therefore the legislative drafter, must confront the complexity of society and provide means within 
the law to respond flexibly to negative consequences such that core constitutional values are maintained.  
If they do not, then they cannot escape ethical responsibility for their behaviour.23 
 
Second, in addition to these ontological concerns, complexity also has epistemological 
implications, particularly in relation to the limits of what we can know about society. While there is an 
exponential increase in the availability of evidence and data across society, there is not a corresponding 
linear expansion in our ability to deal with the intractable challenges to which that evidence and data is 
addressed.  Instead, there are continual, bounded and emerging limits to human knowledge and public 
policy due to, inter alia, physiological limitations on humans to retain, analyse, and reflect on that 
data.24 These limits provide some parameters through which we can both attempt to conceptualise the 
emergent character of a policy area, and the manner of interaction between it and our proposed policy 
response.25  This, in turn, means that while legal and policy actors can achieve some degree of 
                                                 
22 J. Webb, ‘Law, ethics, and complexity: Complexity theory and the normative reconstruction of law’ (2005) 52 
Cleveland State Law Review 227, 239; see also JB. Ruhl and H.J. Ruhl Jr., ‘The arrow of the law in the modern 
administrative state: Using complexity theory to reveal diminishing returns and increasing risks the burgeoning 
of law poses to society’ (1997) 30(Winter) University of California Davis Law Review 405, 426-427; for 
exposition of the original ‘butterfly effect’ concept, see E.N. Lorenz, The Essence of Chaos (Seattle: Washington 
University Press, 1993). 
23 Ibid Webb. 
24 See, for example, A. Badcock, ‘Can Complexity Save Development Theory?’ in J. Bogg and R. Geyer (eds) 
Complexity, Science & Society (Oxford: Radcliffe, 2007). 
25 n 11 above, 81-82; P. Cilliers, ‘Difference, Identity and Complexity’ in P. Cilliers, and R. Preiser (eds) 
Complexity, Difference and Identity (London: Springer, 2010), 8-10. 
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predictability supported by experimental results they must often combine them with uncertainty and 
interpretation.26  Overly prescriptive legislative and regulatory strategies will not, therefore, prevent 
regulatory failure, crises, and instability.27  Nor will such an approach protect the state from external or 
internal vulnerabilities, it merely gives the appearance of doing so, which is altogether more risky.28   
 
Third, given the emergent character of social interaction, depth of variation and importance of 
knowledge gained from experience,29 only probabilistic and pragmatic assumptions about future 
behaviour can be made.30 Consequently, policy and legal actors cannot rely on purely ‘evidence based’ 
strategies, but must continually adapt to environmental changes and learn to make complexity-informed 
judgments,31 since there is no achievable end state or final order.32 This means recognising the strengths 
and weaknesses of quantitative and qualitative methodological, evidence-based and interpretive 
strategies, and balancing them against each other in order to support appropriate public policies.  The 
key is in enabling local actors to maximise their ability to respond to complexity within a stable 
framework to create the greatest likelihood of healthy evolution and adaptation.33  From a complexity 
perspective, the legal-policy process is much more ‘art’ than ‘science’. 
 
Fourth, complexity thinking stresses the difference between simple, complicated and complex 
systems and strategies.34 A simple system, like a pendulum, is highly predictable, has clear causal 
                                                 
26 For example, Geyer and Rihani n 7 above; Ruhl and Ruhl n 22 above; JB. Ruhl and J. Salzman, ‘Mozart and 
the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State’ (2003) 91 Georgetown Law 
Journal 757-850. 
27 J. Murray, ‘Regulating for ecological resilience: a new agenda for financial regulation’ in Jamie Murray, T.E. 
Webb, Steven Wheatley (eds) Complexity Theory and Law: Mapping an Emergent Jurisprudence (London: 
Routledge, 2018). 
28 T.E. Webb, ‘Asylum and complexity: the vulnerable identity of law as a complex system’ in J. Murray, T.E. 
Webb, S. Wheatley (eds) Complexity Theory and Law: Mapping an Emergent Jurisprudence (London: Routledge, 
2018). 
29 But note the caveats in K.A. Richardson, ‘The hegemony of the physical sciences: an exploration in complexity 
thinking’ (2005) 37 Futures 615-653, 623. 
30 n 16 above, 110. 
31 n 25 above, 16. 
32 P. Cilliers, ‘The Philosophical Importance of Thinking Complexity’ in P. Cilliers (eds) Thinking Complexity 
(Mansfield, MA: ISCE Publishing, 2007), 4. 
33 Geyer and Rihani n 7 above; Ruhl n 21 above. 
34 K. Mainzer, Thinking in Complexity: the Computational Dynamics of Matter, Mind and Mankind (Berlin: 
Springer, 4th ed, 2004). 
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attributes and its past and future processes, given clear inputs, can be calculated. A complicated system 
like a mechanical clock, or even a highly complicated jet engine, are fundamentally similar in that, if 
data about their operation is robust, then the outputs from the system are quantifiable, and the 
reductionist scientific method is both applicable and effective for understanding these systems.35 There 
are no hidden surprises in complicated systems. They can be understood, modelled, and controlled. On 
the other hand, complex systems and situations are a combination of structures and boundaries with 
adaptive and emergent properties.36 They are neither fully orderly nor random. They are, at best, 
partially knowable, predictable, and controllable. The mechanical clock and jet engine can run over 
lengthy periods of time, but they will continue to operate as a clock or a jet engine and respond 
predictably to specified inputs. A complex system, such as a living organism, does not follow this 
pattern.  In response to their environment, they reproduce and evolve, demonstrating emergent 
behaviour and adaptations that become increasingly unpredictable as the time-horizon extends.  This 
can be seen in the evolution of, for example, influenza viruses. Biological systems are complex systems 
living in adaptive and emergent environments. Human beings, through the phenomena of 
consciousness, social organisation, use of technology, and creation of individual and group meanings 
and narratives, add an additional layer of social complexity on to their already complex biological 
existence. 
 
Extending this to the policy realm, an example of a simple/complicated system interpretation 
of policy-making can be found in the rational, orderly, modernist, ‘Westminster model’ of policy, one 
of the dominant frames of reference for Western public policy since the Second World War. The 
framework has been through a number of transformations, most recently the move from ‘new public 
management’ to ‘evidence-based policy making’ linked to audit and target cultures,37 but its core 
foundations have remained untouched.  These are, rationalism (we can know a given situation), 
causality (clear inputs will lead to known, proportionate effects), reductionism (discrete parts of a policy 
                                                 
35 n 29 above. 
36 Webb n 12 above. 
37 D. Richards and M. Smith, Governance and Public Policy in the UK (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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can be separated and understood in isolation), predictability (we can know where the policy is going) 
and determinism (we control the path of the policy).38  This led to a strong centralising tendency and 
emphasis on hierarchical, command and control approaches to policy.39 From this orderly perspective, 
all policy problems can be studied and understood, broken down into their parts and adjusted so they 
will work better. In this sense, these issues are treated as being no different from the workings of a 
mechanical clock or jet engine. As we have discussed above, and will explore below, a complexity 
perspective is highly critical of the foundation, method, and claims of more orderly/modernist 
interpretations of the social sciences and policy making.   
 
Legislative Drafters and Complexity 
As is clear from the academic literature and our informal discussions with drafters, the role of the 
drafters is at the centre of multiple tensions/balances within the legislative process.  Though they might 
lack obvious agency in terms of initiating legislative processes – which is properly the prerogative of 
political representatives – drafters do possess agency as regards the construction of the text, and the 
expert advice given to political representatives on how to achieve their goals.40 Drafters are highly 
educated, trained professionals who often work within the field for long periods of time. They are stable 
actors in a dynamic environment, well-versed in the legislative process, the intricacies of the law, and 
the need for their work to be comprehensible. However, even given a limited remit to improve access, 
enhance clarity, and simplify the law, their task is a delicate balancing exercise. As Stanley Edwards 
wrote:  
 
‘Any legal contract or statute should be written so that a person of reasonable 
intelligence, reading it in good faith, can understand it. But it should be 
                                                 
38 Geyer and Rihani n 7 above, 22. 
39 M. Powers, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); J.C. Scott, 
Seeing Like a State (New York: Yale University Press, 1999). 
40 Lord Neuberger, ‘General, Equal and Certain: Law Reform Today and Tomorrow’ (2012) 33(3) Statute Law 
Review 323, 330-331 
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written with such a degree of precision that a person of Machiavellian 
cleverness, reading it in bad faith, cannot misunderstand it.’41  
 
This statement catches both the more technical side of the drafters’ role and the much messier political 
side. The drafter must consider reasonably intelligent actors acting in good faith (judges, law abiding 
citizens, public servants), devious ones determined to distort the law (fraudsters, exploitative 
employers), and the myriad range of interpretive possibilities arising between these two positions. 
Drafters work at a key point in the legal/policy process, framing legislation that could have huge socio-
economic impacts on a range of powerful and not-so-powerful groups.42 In addition to this, they are 
supposed to be carrying out the will of their elected leaders who, unsurprisingly given the complex 
nature of society, often make contradictory and confusing demands on their expertise. 
 
At the same time, society and the law itself are in flux. The law must respond to changes in 
social norms (for example, attitudes to abortion, sexuality, religion), technology (the internet, health, 
big data), and political persuasions (new governments, political parties and movements). Though 
superficially reactive and lacking legislative initiative, drafters are more than just skilled craftsmen 
responding to a brief, delicately using words to help those of ‘good faith’ and hinder those of ‘bad faith’. 
They actively advise on how to achieve a government’s objectives, and respond to legislative concerns 
over provisional language.43  They also have a principled, indeed constitutional, role to play in offering 
counsel on the constitutional probity of legislative proposals.44  And, more than anything else, they 
write, shape and are in direct contact with the text itself.45  They are tightly linked to a range of other 
governmental and non-governmental actors who have their own interests and needs (good or bad; 
reasonable or unreasonable) in the legislative process and will try to shape and improve bills as they 
                                                 
41 S.E. Edwards, ‘Drafting Fiscal Legislation’ (1984) Canadian Tax Journal 727, 728 
42 See R. Cormacain, ‘Legislation, legislative drafting and the rule of law’ (2017) 5(2) The Theory and Practice 
of Legislation 115; D.L. Revell, ‘Enhancing the Legislative Process: The Value of the Legislative Drafter’ (2011) 
32(2) Statute Law Review 149. 
43 Revell ibid, 151-152. 
44 Cormacain, above n 42; ibid, 157-158. 
45 See S. Höfler, M. Nussbaumer and H. Xanthaki, ‘Legislative Drafting’ in U. Karpen and H. Xanthaki (eds) 
Legislation in Europe: A Comprehensive Guide for Scholars and Practitioners (Oxford: Hart, 2017), 146-152. 
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pass through that process. Given these complicated (interacting with a large number of ‘parts’) and 
complex (managing emergent and unpredictable demands and interests) aspects to their position, they 
are a fascinating case study for complexity thinkers. 
 
Plain Language/Good Law Initiatives: Past and Present 
Given the nature of the drafters’ role, and the long-established cliché of law’s complexity, it should 
come as no surprise that the desire to meet the goals of clarity, simplicity and accessibility are not new.  
As early as the 16th and 17th centuries in England, Edward VI (r.1547-1553) and James I (r.1603-1625) 
both expressed concerns regarding legal complicatedness.46  In the 18th century, Thomas Jefferson, US 
President, lamented the ‘verbosity … endless tautologies … involutions of case within case and 
parenthesis within parenthesis’ of the law which rendered it ‘incomprehensible, not only to common 
readers but to the lawyers themselves.’47 Later, in 1835 the Commissioners appointed to inquire into 
the consolidation of statute law in England reported that: 
 
‘We apprehend that the mere extirpation of all such enactments as are 
obsolete and superfluous, the rejection of repetitions of terms of frequent 
occurrence, and the extrication of material words from the superfluity of 
language by which the law is often obscured, would greatly reduce the bulk 
and consequent costliness of the Statute Book, and would render it more 
accessible and intelligible to the generality of your Majesty’s subjects.’48 
 
These concerns are echoed, as we have indicated above, not just elsewhere in the historical record,49 
but in more recent attempts within various jurisdictions to respond to legislative complexity. 
                                                 
46 The Renton Committee, The Preparation of Legislation, Report Cmnd 6053 (1975), 2.8. 
47 Ibid, 2.10 
48 Royal Commission on the Consolidation of Statute Law, Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire 
into the Consolidation of the Statute Law, HC 406 (1835), 5. 




Recent Plain Language/Good Law Initiatives 
In the UK the Good Law Initiative (GLI) of the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel has produced a 
number of documents targeting clarification, simplification and accessibility, chief among which is the 
When Laws Become Too Complex review.50  The GLI recognised three core problems with the statute 
book; ‘… the volume…, the quality of legislation, and the perception of disproportionate complexity.’51  
Some of the responses to these concerns align closely with the business-orientated simplification 
agenda. For example, the Red Tape Challenge aims to reduce the amount of legislation, especially 
secondary legislation, and in some cases primary legislation as well.52 Elsewhere, the concern with 
volume focuses on quantification (eg word count, formatting, readability indicators, complexity 
indicators)53 to improve the clarity of legislation by treating it as a mathematical problem.54  Both of 
these responses suggest that, if the clarity, simplicity and accessibility of law is to be improved, then 
the complexity of law must be reduced; hence the GLI’s goal is ‘to avoid generating excessively 
complex law … to act positively to promote accessibility, ease of navigation, and simplification.’55 
Simplification of the statute book, along with the format of legislation and the ability of individuals to 
access that legislation is seen as the route to improving understanding of the law and reducing 
difficulties around engagement and compliance.  While on the one hand there is a clear desire in the 
GLI to improve accessibility for citizens as a way of better aligning with the tenets of the rule of law, 
the wider governmental concern when looking at statutory complicatedness has been to focus on the 
burden of complexity on business.56 
 
                                                 
50 n 2 above. 
51 Ibid 2. 
52 ibid 4, 17. 
53 For example, see Office for Tax Simplification Project, ‘Tax Complexity Collection’, at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/tax-complexity#recent-documents   
54 n 2 above, 14; see also R. Heaton, ‘Good Law’, (TedX, UK Parliament, 2013), at 
<https://youtu.be/p8GUG0S9esU>. 
55 n 2 above, 29. 
56 ibid, 4. 
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Similarly, the desire to reduce legal complexity in the US has been driven by concern around 
regulatory burdens and economic considerations on the one hand, and public access on the other.  There 
are examples at both the federal and state levels.  The Administrative Conference of the United States 
(ACUS), an independent federal agency, provides an overview of the history of PL work at the federal 
level; for example, an Executive Order made in 1998 by President Clinton which called for future 
regulations to comply with plain language standards.57  As ACUS indicates, Clinton’s Order encouraged 
the plain language revision of existing legislation in part to increase governmental accountability to 
citizens, but also to ‘[save] the Government and the private sector time, effort, and money.’58  More 
recently, in December 2017, ACUS recommended that all federal agencies should follow the Federal 
Plain Language Guidelines.59  The Guidelines provide, inter alia, direction on appropriate use of 
vocabulary, sentence and paragraph structure, and other formatting that can aid readability,60 all of 
which are familiar concepts associated with the PL movement.  At the state-level, the 
PlainLanguage.gov website provides numerous examples of state-level plain language regulations.61  
One such provision is the Plain Language in Consumer Contract Act 1993 passed by the Pennsylvania 
General Assembly.62  The Act expressly legislates against contracts that are ‘designed in a way that 
makes them hard for consumers to understand.’63  Though in the next breath the Act implies that part 
of the motivation for incorporating this protection is connected with economic factors, in particular 
aiding competition between businesses.64 
 
                                                 
57 ACUS, ‘Plain Language in Regulatory Drafting’ (Recommendation Number 2017-3), at 
<https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/plain-language-regulatory-drafting>. 
58 President Clinton’s 1998 Executive Order (63 FR 31885 Plain Language in Government Writing); see also the 
Paperwork Reduction Act 1980 Pub L No. 95-511, 94 Stat 2812 preamble and first section of the 44 USC 3501; 
amendments made by the Paperwork Reduction Act 1995 Pub L No. 104-13, 109 Stat 163; and the Plain Writing 
Act 2010, Pub L No. 111-274, 124 Stat 2861 (2010).  These materials are supplemented by the Plain Language 
Action and Information Network (PLAIN), Federal Plain Language Guidelines (2011), at 
<https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/>; and Office of the Federal Register, Guidance on Drafting Legal 
Documents, at <https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/write/legal-docs>. 
59 n 57 above, Recommendation 1; see also PLAIN ibid. 
60 PLAIN ibid Section III. 
61 See PLAIN, at <https://www.plainlanguage.gov/examples/regulations/>, <‘State Statutes’>. 
62 Plain Language Consumer Contract Act 1993 PL 128, No. 29, s 1; partially amended in 2006 by PL 1563 No. 
176.  




In Australia, the goal is to use plain English to reduce the complexity of legislation.  However, 
the recognition that there must be a balance between simplification and clarification is more firmly 
stated than in the UK and US.65  The Australian Office of Parliamentary Counsel recognises that some 
degree of complicatedness in legislation is unavoidable, and that ‘it is unrealistic to assume that complex 
subject and policy areas … regulated by legislation can be reduced to rules that can be understood by 
the public generally.’66  Here then, the view is that what is desired is certainty about what the law means 
without clouding that meaning by attempting to make that certainty too granular – clarity without 
complexity.  The Australian approach is not about brevity.  There is a balance to be struck by drafters 
who should ‘weigh up whether the simplicity gained by using coherent principles drafting is worth the 
loss of precision that results.’67  The focus is on thinking about what tools are available to the drafter to 
make the text more accessible to an audience with a good technical knowledge of the field to which the 
law applies.68  At the same time, there is some realism about what is achievable in the context of the 
operating environment of the drafter,69 albeit counterbalanced by a belief that complexity can be 
controlled.70 
 
Whereas the PL/GL drafting movement has only recently come to official notice in the UK and 
Australia – though its presence in the literature long-precedes this – Canada is said to have a much 
longer history of plain language drafting.  Krongold, arguing in the early 1990s that the Canadian 
drafters produced more readable legislation, relayed a quip from the eminent British jurist Sir Robert 
Megarry that the Canadian Statute book is: 
 
                                                 
65 But note Cabinet Office and the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, Guidance on Good Law, at 
<https://www.gov.uk/guidance/good-law>. 
66 Office of Parliamentary Counsel of Australia, Reducing Complexity in Legislation (Canberra: Australian 
Government, 2016), [7]. 
67 Ibid [18]. 
68 Ibid [14-26], [32-33], [41]. 
69 Ibid [145]. 
70 Ibid [146]. 
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 ‘… too plain.  I have read many, many pages of them; and found that I could 
understand all that I read… That is not the sort of thing that one ought to find 
in any well-mannered statute book.’71 
 
In view of the bilingual, bijural, multi-cultural and geographically diverse nature – the presence of 
multiple languages, civil and common law legal traditions, First Nations and western-colonial 
perspectives, and tremendously densely and extremely sparsely populated areas – of Canada’s national, 
provincial, and territorial legal systems,  there has arguably been a pressing practical need for clarity in 
law making to ensure that, at a federal level all Canadian citizens are treated equally despite the 
operation of different provincial traditions.72  This may explain the much earlier official interest in 
developing drafting techniques, including those associated with PL.  The Uniform Law Conference of 
Canada/ Conférence Pour L’harmonisation des Lois au Canada (ULCC/CHLC), which is an 
independent organisation that brings together various Canadian provincial bar associations, government 
drafters, and others,73 and which receives government support in other respects, recommends in its 
Drafting Conventions that: 
 
‘An Act should be written simply, clearly and concisely, with the required 
degree of precision, and as much as possible in ordinary language. 
 
                                                 
71 S. Krongold, ‘Writing Laws: Making them Easier to Understand’ (1992) 24(2) Ottawa Law Review 495, 508. 
72 Numerous texts on bijuralism and legal harmonization are available from the Department of Justice (Canada), 
at <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/harmonization/>; see also history of this thinking in Uniform Law 
Conference of Canada/ Conférence Pour L’harmonisation des Lois au Canada (ULCC/CHLC), Committee 
Appointed to Prepare Bilingual Legislative Drafting Conventions for the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, 
Report: Uniform Acts Drafting Conventions (Canada:, undated), at <http://www.ulcc.ca/en/uniform-acts-en-gb-
1/546-drafting-conventions/66-drafting-conventions-act>. 
73 Including organisations in other jurisdictions, eg United States Uniform Law Commission; Mexican Center of 
Uniform Law / Congreso Internacional Derecho Uniforme. 
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Simplicity and conciseness of language can be made to exist with precision 
in a well organized text.  It is important not to exaggerate the degree of 
precision that is required.’74  
 
The view of ULCC/CHLC is that not only can simplicity and clarity be achieved without compromising 
precision or certainty, but that this can be done in the context of a bilingual, bijural legal system; though 
the organisation does avoid politically contentious areas of the law.   
 
This conclusion is shared by the Canadian Department of Justice which has made a commitment to 
ensure ‘that the [legal] guidelines it provides be written in clear and plain language.’75  This is 
accompanied by a guide which views the readability of legislative texts as being essential to providing 
‘clarity and predictability of regulation for business.’76  As with other jurisdictions, while the wider 
PL/GL movement is concerned with questions of clarification, simplification and accessibility for 
individual citizens, a driving political force behind these initiatives is a concern for the regulatory 
burden of legal complicatedness for business. 
 
It is not just common law jurisdictions which are taking this kind of approach. In the European 
Union, for example, one aspect of the Better Regulation Agenda is the Regulatory Fitness and 
Performance Programme (REFIT), which aims, inter alia, ‘to make EU law simpler and easier to 
understand.’77  It should be noted, however, that in contrast to the efforts in the UK, US, Australia and 
Canada (notwithstanding the tendency in those jurisdictions for government to express a concern about 
                                                 
74 ULCC/CHLC n 72 above, [2];  see also Department of Justice (Canada), Legislative Drafting (updated January 
2015) at < http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/legis-redact/index.html>, which deals with, inter alia, the 
complexity and organization of sentence structure. 
75 Department of Justice (Canada), Information on Regulations (updated June 2015) at 
<http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/trans/ar-lr/ior-icr.html>. 
76 Department of Justice (Canada) Guide to fostering the readability of legislative texts (updated February 2018), 
at <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/trans/ar-lr/rg-gl/p1.html>. 




the impact of regulation on small businesses), the focus of the European Commission is solely on ‘small 
businesses, which can be disproportionately affected by the burden of implementing EU rules.’78   
 
Whereas other jurisdictions consider the appearance of the text and how it can be interpreted, 
the European Commission is primarily focussed on the reduction in volume of legislation via, for 
example, codification, repeal, the use of sunset clauses, and a reduction in the use of binding regulations 
by self-regulation and similar initiatives.79  This approach appears, therefore, to be less focussed on 
improving the clarity of regulations, than it is on reducing the volume of legislation so that – purportedly 
– the remaining law takes less time and energy to understand and comply with.  Similarly, while one of 
the objectives of the Better Regulation Agenda is to ‘ensure citizens and stakeholders can contribute 
throughout the policy- and law-making process’,80 the potential for increasing accessibility has no 
corresponding objective to increase the accessibility of the end-product for citizens.  Priority 7 of the 
REFIT Scoreboard for 2017, for example, concerns ‘[u]pholding the rule of law and linking up Europe’s 
justice systems’, but is predominantly concerned with perceived positive changes in the impact and 
implementation of the law and any associated economic savings, rather than on the ability of citizens 
to understand the regulations themselves.81 
 
Plain Language/Good Law Initiatives: Clarity, Simplicity and Accessibility 
What unites these different approaches is the modernist outlook which underpins them.  There is a 
shared belief that if the text can be made to be ‘just so’, if the variables can be controlled, then we will 
have reached the best iteration of the law possible.  In consequence, efforts towards clarification focus 
on improving the readability and structure of a text to make key terminology and obligations clearer to 
                                                 
78 Ibid 
79 Ibid; see also European Commission, REFIT Scorecard 2017 (Report, October 2017), at < 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/regulatory-fitness-and-performance-programme-refit-and-10-priorities-
commission-scoreboard-summary-2017_en>. 
80 European Commission, Better regulation: why and how <https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-
process/planning-and-proposing-law/better-regulation-why-and-how_en> 
81 n 79 above, 391-442. 
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specified audiences based on a belief that a final appropriate interpretation of the text can be articulated.  
Similarly, the goal of simplification is unapologetically reductionist in its efforts to lessen the volume 
and complicatedness of the statute book.  The expectation is that the wording of the statute book can be 
distilled and, properly done, this will make appropriate interpretation of the text – legislative intention 
– self-evident.  Sometimes political considerations, such as a belief that regulation is burdensome, may 
overlay this mechanical approach, but it does not change the way the simplification operation is carried 
out.  Lastly, accessibility, although prima facie a principled political objective with roots in the rule of 
law expectation that people should be able to know the law by which they are governed,82 also expects 
to improve legislation by increasing access to it, such that, at some point, accessibility will be optimised. 
 
The difficulty with a reductionist approach is that it tends to only focus on some of the indicators 
of complicatedness,83 while at the same time ignoring the emergent, complex characteristics of law and 
politics.84  There are at least three problems with this.  First, it neglects to consider the numerous socio-
political obstacles to achieving the kind of agreement that only Rousseau’s General Will could hope 
for.  Secondly, it downplays context.  As has been identified in the literature on law and complexity, 
devoting a ‘myopic attention’ to individual rules – or, by extension, particular methods for optimising 
all rules – is unwise because the operation and interpretation of individual rules is contextual;85 both in 
terms of the interpreter’s perspective and the operational context of the rule.86  Third, the operation of 
rules is not fixed in time.87  Changes in socio-political, ethical and operational context mean that the 
pursuit of perfectly balanced rules is unrealistic.  At best, as Ruhl and Salzman argue, one should 
attempt to ‘[build] adaptive structures,’88 that, ideally, respond to normal change.   
 
                                                 
82 Evident in both formal – eg J. Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ (1977) 93 LQR 195 – and substantive, eg 
Lord Bingham, ‘The Rule of Law’ (2007) 66(1) CLJ 67 – accounts of the rule of law. 
83 Office of Tax Simplification, ‘Complexity Index’ (June 2015) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/office-of-tax-simplification-complexity-index>  
84 See again Ruhl and Katz, n 21 above. 
85 n 26 above, 764. 
86 Cilliers (2005a), n 12 above. 
87 n 26 above, 764. 
88 ibid; see also Ruhl (2008), n 21 above, 903. 
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As we have already made clear, this does not mean that there are not justifications for pursuing 
the aims of PL/GL.  The most obvious is that, if you expect someone to abide by the law, then the 
legislature should try to guarantee that they can know what the law is.  The absence of this type of 
understanding makes a mockery of the idea of the rule of law.89  At the same time, it is important to 
recognise that, given the complex nature of society and the legislative process, not only is it impossible 
for the statutory drafter to perfect their art, and arrive at a final, agreed upon language, there is more to 
law than statute alone.  The physical text of the statute and the legislative process which crafts it 
undeniably plays a part in shaping our understanding of the law, but – as has long been the mantra of 
socio-legal approaches to law – we need to think more deeply about the context in which statute exists.  
Feldman’s characterisation of constitutional texts, in this case related to devolution, as only a framework 
for starting discussion recognises the centrality of context to discourse around legislative meaning: 
 
‘… the text only provides a focus for discussion, and a way of legitimizing 
conclusions by presenting them as the outcome of an interpretation of an 
authoritative text.  The text itself provides a way of formulating and 
approaching the questions, but (even in a purportedly codified constitution) 
does not always provide the answers: these tend to lurk in the gaps between 
the terms of the text, or between form and reality.’90 
Clarity 
With Feldman’s observation in mind we can turn to consider each of the goals of the PL/GL movement 
in detail.  Those seeking clarity either want to enable a specific group of specialists, such as those 
operating within or regulating a particular industry, to better know what the rules are, or they want to 
make the law clearer for society at large.  These two interpretations of clarity are not compatible since 
the nomenclature of a professional body is unlikely to be comprehensible to the public at large, and 
                                                 
89 Lord Simon of Glaisdale, 'The Renton Report - Ten Years On' (1985) 6(1) Stat L Rev 133, 133; Lord Neuberger, 
'General, Equal and Certain: Law Reform Today and Tomorrow' (2012) 33(3) Stat L Rev 323, 325. 
90 D. Feldman, ‘None, one or several? Perspectives on the UK’s Constitution(s)’ (2005) 64(2) CLJ 329; for a 
similar expression concerning ordinary legislation see, R. Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation (Toronto: Irwin Law, 
3rd ed, 2016), 38-39. 
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conversely the absence of such technical detail may make the manner in which the rules are to operate 
unclear in specialist contexts.91  It should also be acknowledged that the public is not a homogenous 
group.  The public is diverse, comprised of a variety of ‘semiotic groups’,92 and this will impact upon 
how different elements of the public interpret law. This indicates both an overlap and a potential 
contradiction between the drive towards clarity, and the pursuit of accessibility. 
 
The problem faced by the PL/GL discourse is that the law does not just need to be clear to the 
public and/or a specific group of regulated professionals.  It also, at the very least, needs to be clear to 
regulators and those having oversight of the regulatory environment, the judiciary.93  For example, 
under the constitutional arrangements of the UK, Parliament is sovereign.  This means that the judges, 
in order to act constitutionally, should be able to justify their interpretation of the law as being an 
accurate reproduction of Parliament’s notional intention.  In other jurisdictions the intentions of a 
legislature might be substituted for, or supplemented by, the wording of a founding constitutional 
document, though this too would require interpretation.  In such circumstances the legislature’s 
intentions might be viewed as unconstitutional and the statute struck down.  In any case, determining 
legislative intention is not simple.  Indeed, how one should interpret the intention of Parliament in 
relation to the powers granted to government ministers for the purposes of deciding whether ministerial 
action is unlawful has a long history in UK public law discourse.94  In essence, there is disagreement 
about how judges should construe the intention of the legislature derived from the words of statute.  In 
practice, even if there were agreement as to the methodology to be employed in interpreting statute, 
when faced with challenges of interpreting ambiguous legislation in general, or its application in 
particular contexts, Feldman and Sullivan’s observations remain apposite.95  Disagreements over 
interpretation, and interpretative methodologies reveals the myth of determining legislative intention, 
                                                 
91 Lord Stow Hill, HL Deb vol 366 cols 1013-1014 10 December 1975. 
92 B.S. Jackson, ‘Legislation in the Semiotics of Law’ in H. van Schooten (ed) Semiotics and Legislation: 
Jurisprudential, institutional and sociological perspectives (Liverpool: Deborah Charles Publications, 1999) cited 
in R. Sullivan, 'The Promise of Plain Language Drafting' (2001) 47 McGill Law Journal 97, 117. 
93 See further, ibid. 
94 For an indication of the debate, see; C. Forsyth (ed) Judicial Review & the Constitution (Oxford: Hart, 2000). 
95 n 90 above. 
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and thus the possibility of ascertaining the meaning to be given to words in the statute book (or a 
constitutional text) because though they might speak through a single document, legislatures are a 
collective body of many voices.96 
 
Not only is it sometimes difficult to determine what Parliament intended a statutory provision 
to mean, judges have also demonstrated a propensity to enhance, reduce, ignore or restructure the words 
of statute to secure what, in their view, is the most appropriate constitutional construction of an answer 
to a legal question.97  This approach, too, has strong support in jurisprudential circles.  For example, 
consider Dworkin’s discussion in his seminal Law’s Empire of the judge and the legislature as 
participants in the development of a chain novel.98  The argument is that, not only is statutory intention 
a nebulous concept, but to establish the meaning of legislation today, and the next chapter in the 
interpretive story, it is important to look both back at (socio-)legal history up to the passage of a given 
statute, and beyond the law to what society expects legislation to mean. Our point is that the PL/GL 
movement’s understanding of statutory clarity focusses too much on the text itself.  It assumes that the 
meaning of the components of the statute are self-evident, or can be made to be so.  On this view, the 
emergent quality of the text, which, even if it is not explicitly recognised in debate around statutory 
interpretation, is forgotten.  Our view is that the meaning of statute is not a product derived by deploying 
the right words in the right order, but is emergent,99 and arises out of the interaction of the text with, 
inter alia, the judiciary.  It is, therefore, important to be frank about the limits of what can be achieved 
by enhancing the clarity of the text itself. 
 
                                                 
96 See also R v Secretary of State for the Environment Transport and the Regions, ex p Spath Holme Ltd [2001] 2 
AC 349, 396. 
97 Consider the majority judgment of Lord Neuberger in R (on the application of Evans) v Attorney General [2015] 
UKSC 21; or the creation of new statutory concepts, as in Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 
(Admin), per Laws LJ, at [59-64]. 
98 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986) (Oxford: Hart, 1998), especially Chapter 9. 
99 See Webb, n 12 above, 141-145; n 21 above, 478; also J. Murray, T.E. Webb, and S. Wheatley, ‘Encountering 
Law’s Complexity’ in J. Murray, T.E. Webb, S. Wheatley (eds) Complexity Theory and Law: Mapping an 




If the problem is linguistic complicatedness, and it is not possible to achieve both clarification for 
specialists, and accessibility for lay people, can the text be simplified as a way of resolving both the 
clarity and accessibility concerns outlined above?100  Here again we see the same type of contradictory 
aims that prevent the idealistic solution of drafting and passing law which is simultaneously clear, 
simple, and accessible.  A legal text which is simple, is economical with words, or which uses the most 
basic language, rather than precise, specialised terminology cannot convey the same clarity of meaning 
as a more detailed text.101  Indeed, text which is too spartan might leave very significant questions 
unanswered, produce confusion later, and thus be dealt with outside of politically representative 
structures by the courts.102  The great irony, of course, is that a text which assiduously considers all 
circumstances to which the law might be addressed, thus producing nominal certainty, is unlikely to be 
clear or accessible to either specialists or lay people.  We suggest that any certainty achieved through 
granular detail is only nominal because legal, indeed social complexity is incompressible.  It is not 
possible to account for all future situations in the text of generally applicable statutes.  If emergence is 
a nonlinear process predicated on the dynamic interaction of an incredibly large number of individuals, 
processes, and institutions,103 and if there is also a lack of certainty about where to draw the boundary 
of the legal system,104 how can we account for all outcomes?  To account for every outcome, we would 
need to produce a model – in this case, a statute –  that was at least as complex as the subject of that 
model.105 
 
As a consequence of this observation, we can also express some concerns about associating 
PL/GL with economic efficiency.  It is argued by some proponents of PL/GL that a balance must be 
                                                 
100 See E.A. Driedger, ‘Legislative Drafting’ (1949) 27 Canadian Bar Review 291, for an example of improved 
drafting driven by improved linguistic expression, for a contemporary view, see H. Xanthaki, Thornton’s 
Legislative Drafting (London: Bloomsbury Professional, 5th ed, 2013). 
101 Baroness Bacon, HL Deb vol 366 col 971 10 December 1975. 
102 Daniel Greenberg, 'Extra words go wrong… and not enough words go even wronger' (2017) 38(1) Statute Law 
Review v, v. 
103 n 16 above, ix. 
104 Webb, n 12 above; also n 25 above; Paul Cilliers, ‘What Can We Learn From a Theory of Complexity?’ (2000) 
2(1) Emergence 23, 28-30. 
105 Ibid; see also n 11 above, and Cilliers (2005a) n 12 above, 263-264. 
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struck between definitional rigour, and the economic burden that comes with the law which that process 
produces.  Simplification of the law, a reduction in definitional rigour, is said to be needed in order to 
lessen the economic cost of complying with the law.106  This claim, like the wider simplification aim, 
relies on two flawed assumptions.  First, as challenged above, that simplifying legal language improves 
accessibility.  Secondly, that simplification eliminates complexity.  We would argue that the contrary 
is more likely.  Reductions in regulatory compliance requirements do not eliminate the complex 
interplay between the regulators, regulated, public, and the state, they just conceal it.  As such, 
simplification may have the effect of increasing uncertainty by making regulatory relationships and 
industrial obligations unclear to the regulated, regulators, judicial bodies and citizens. 
 
The focus on simplifying the law for either economic or wider democratic aims misses the 
point.  For example, consider the academic debate over legal complexity in the United States.  As an 
aspect of the simplification and reduction in economic burden agendas, Epstein argues against increases 
in the volume of legislation – the purported source of complexity107 – because this also tends, it is 
asserted, to result in a commensurate economic burden.  To combat the perceived increase in the volume 
and complexity of law, and in particular to halt the increasing volume of law as a source of complexity, 
he argues that we should ‘insist that every new legal wrinkle pay its way by some improvement in the 
allocation of social resources.’108  This implies that there is a balance to be struck between the degree 
of legal specificity, and the associated costs of legal implementation, compliance and enforcement.109  
This argument rests on the belief that we should manage legal volume, ie complicatedness, as a way of 
dealing with legal complexity.  Ruhl and Katz view this construction of legal complexity as incorrect.  
As an example, they argue that: 
                                                 
106 Office of Parliamentary Counsel (Australia), Causes of complex legislation and strategies to address these 
(Canberra: Australian Government, 2011), 1; see also the Cabinet Office, Red tape challenge, 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20150319091528/https://www.redtapechallenge.cabinetoffice.gov.u
k/about/>.  
107 R.A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), ix. 
108 Ibid 307. 
109 See L. Kaplow, ‘A model of the optimal complexity of legal rules’ (1995) 11(1) Journal of Law, Economics 
& Organisation 150; V. Fon and F. Parisi, ‘On the optimal specificity of legal rules’ (2007) 3(2) Journal of 




‘The [US] Tax Code is not complex because of its costs of compliance, 
difficult readability, number of rates and special provisions, or the complexity 
of tax compliance software. Rather, the Tax Code imposes costly compliance 
burdens, is difficult to read, has lots of rates and special provisions, and poses 
a challenge to software developers because it is complex.’110 
 
By extension, while cost, readability and volume might be indicators of complexity, they do not allow 
conclusions to be drawn about whether that complexity is appropriate in that context.  Reducing costs, 
improving readability, and decreasing the number of rates and provisions will only impact those metrics, 
it does not deal with the underlying complexity of the subject matter, or the possible problem that 
complexity may pose.111  This conclusion is made even more emphatically in the closing pages of the 
paper where Ruhl and Katz write that ‘there is no a priori basis for asserting that all legal complexity 
is structurally or normatively bad.’112  This implies that the goal of simplifying, clarifying, and 
increasing the accessibility of the law as a means of reducing legal complicatedness rather misses the 
point.  The law is not merely complicated, it is complex.  Moreover, and regardless of how exactly you 
construe the boundaries of law,113 it is nested within society, which is also complex.  The insights which 
complexity theory offers suggest that it is not a question of dealing with the indicators of complexity, 
at least not as a primary objective, but rather of establishing a way of thinking about the complex nature 
of law and society that is equipped to work with that complexity. 
 
Accessibility 
Accessibility is central to the thinking of many drafters within the PL/GL movement.114  In the first 
place it is concerned with changing the way the legislation is presented on the page and the ease with 
                                                 
110 Ruhl and Katz, n 21 above, 197. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid, 240. 
113 Webb 2013, n 12 above. 
114 For discussion, see Y. Roznai and N. Mordechay, ‘Access to Justice 2.0: Access to Legislation and Beyond’ 
(2015) 3(3) The Theory and Practice of Legislation 333. 
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which the text can be viewed by the user.  Innovations, such as the work of the UK’s Office of the 
Parliamentary Counsel and the National Archives on the legislation.gov website, which aims to provide 
a complete database of all live primary legislation in the UK, along with historic records of amendments 
to the text, is an example par excellence of the successful implementation of this type of accessibility.  
Not only is this type of thinking likely to produce increased accessibility per se for the general public, 
it intended to make it easier for specific groups of non-lawyers, such as those working in a particular 
industry, to access the law regulating their work.  In this respect, clarifying the law for a specific group, 
such that the language is comprehensible to them, is likely to make it more accessible for that group.  
This shows how the affinity between clarification and accessibility is dependent on the particular target 
the drafter is aiming at. 
 
The idea of increasing the ease with which statute can be accessed is wholly unobjectionable.  
However, access per se does not increase access in terms of understanding.  As we have said, we think 
that the PL/GL movement, in focussing primarily on the text of the statute itself, devotes insufficient 
attention to how the statute will operate in the context of the wider socio-legal system.  It is for this 
reason we argue that the PL/GL outlook is modernist; it relies on perfecting the construction of the text.  
It attempts to reduce legal meaning to a quantifiable, stable output.115  Complexity thinking indicates 
that social systems tend not to be amenable to such measures.  Even laws with ostensibly plain meanings 
only retain this appearance until they encounter an unanticipated counterfactual, or when the social 
context changes.  The conclusion that the meaning of statute can be conclusively ascertained outside of 
a court, such that providing access to statute is equivalent to providing access to the understanding of 
the law in a given context is, therefore, problematic.   
 
                                                 
115 For problems with this approach, see Ruhl and Ruhl n 22 above, 426-427; JB. Ruhl, ‘The Fitness of Law: 
Using Complexity Theory to Describe The Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning For 
Democracy’ (1996) 49 Vanderbilt Law Review 1407, 1474-1475; Webb n 21 above, 478; and also J. Murray, 
‘Complexity Theory and Socio-Legal Studies, Coda: Liverpool Law’ (2008) 29 Liverpool Law Review 227. 
28 
 
In some respects the observation that there is more to law than statute is acknowledged in 
PL/GL discourse.116  This can be seen, for example, in the idea that judge-made law, the common law, 
constitutes a significant part of the law in force in the UK and other jurisdictions,117 and that statute law 
exists alongside constitutional principles like the rule of law.118  However, in other respects the 
movement, in seeking to achieve the competing aims of improving clarity, simplicity and accessibility 
of the statute book does so only if a peculiarly limited interpretation of what constitutes ‘law’ and legal 
questions is adopted.  It might be argued that this is more a problem with how PL/GL is presented, 
indeed the UK’s GLI recognises the ‘ghostly absence’ of case law in the PL/GL age,119 but accuracy of 
presentation is something which the PL/GL movement purports to address.  It is difficult to square this 
narrow view when it is considered, for example, in relation to the construction of statutory intention, 
judicial interpretation of statutes, and the requirements of constitutional principles, since it implies that, 
among other things, case law is of little consequence in a common law system. 
 
The American Bar Association (ABA), for example, has cautioned against blindly pursuing 
PL/GL objectives.120  The ABA is not alone in its concern that simplicity may produce,121 inter alia, 
imprecision – where appropriate technical language is not employed, or an inappropriate increase in 
administrative discretion is permitted – if the legal problem is thought too knotty to articulate simply in 
legislation, such that responsibility for working out the detail is passed to administrators.122  The 
complex nature of socio-legal relationships does not go away simply because we make the statutes 
regulating them ostensibly simpler.123 
 
                                                 
116 See R. Heaton, 'Making the law easier for users: the role of statutes' (London: Institute of Advanced Legal 
Studies, speech, 2013), transcript at <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/making-the-law-easier-for-users-
the-role-of-statutes--2>  
117 Ibid. 
118 Revell, n 42 above, 157-158. 
119 n 116 above. 
120 See American Bar Association (ABA), Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice; State and 
Local Government Law; Environment, Energy and Resources; Recommendation (1999), 
<https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/adminlaw/plain99.authcheckdam.pdf>. 
121 See, for example, Australia, discussed above at 000. 
122 See n 20 above. 
123 Ruhl and Katz n 21 above, 197. 
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The Stacey Diagram: the drafters’ role and implications of clarity and 
simplicity 
Complexity and complex systems approaches can appear to be esoteric and meta-theoretical, but they 
are, as our consideration of statutory drafting above demonstrates, surprisingly simple and can easily 
be applied to everyday human situations. One of the most parsimonious and effective tools of 
complexity thinking for public policy and management is the Stacey Diagram.124 
 
 
Figure 1: Modified Stacey Diagram 
 
As seen in Figure 1, the diagram combines just two axes based on the degree of certainty and 
the degree of agreement for a particular policy area. High levels of certainty indicate that the issue is 
                                                 
124  n 3 above.  Stacey developed the diagram or matrix in the early 1990s. However, he later distanced himself 
from it over concerns that it was too limiting in reflecting the fully reflective nature of management processes; 
see R. Stacey, D. Griffin and P. Shaw Complexity and Management: Fad or Radical Challenge to Systems 
Thinking? (London: Routledge, 2002). However, the diagram remains popular for a number of complexity related 
academic areas.  
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well known and easily understood, while low levels of certainty imply that it is unknown/unknowable 
and that there are great differences in opinion over the issue, even among experts. Meanwhile, high 
levels of agreement denote substantial public agreement over the nature of, and solution to the issue, 
while low levels of certainty imply substantial public debate and disagreement. 
 
These two axes create five main zones of decision-making: 
Zone 1: high certainty-high agreement. In this zone, the issue is well understood, and the 
policy/legal response agreed between the majority of key stakeholders. Data on the issue is 
clear, abundant and easily accessible. Repetitive techno-rational decision-making based on 
evidence-based actions, audit, and targeting strategies works well here. Bureaucratised and 
formalised responses and structures are optimised in this zone (eg NPM). 
 
Zone 2: high certainty-low agreement. In this zone, there is clear and abundant data and the 
experts/actors understand the problem. However, the stakeholders disagree over how to respond 
to it. In this case, more evidence is of little use and political bargaining and consensus building 
become key decision-making tactics. 
 
Zone 3: low certainty-high agreement. In this area, all of the main actors agree about the nature 
of the issue, but there is no simple answer or policy response to the problem. Available data 
may be partial, incomplete, or contradictory. Even experts do not know how to properly respond 
to it and/or there is significant debate over the best response. Here, multiple strategies may be 
required, and discretionary decision-making becomes increasingly important. More data may 
be helpful. However, if the problem is intractable then it may only reaffirm uncertainty. 
 
Zone 4: mixed certainty-mixed agreement. This is the most common zone of policy and legal 
decision-making. Data may be uncertain and contested. It is an area in which stakeholders and 
experts disagree, to varying levels, over the nature of, and responses to the issue. This requires 
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a flexible response that blends political decision-making with evidence-based processes and 
discretionary decision-making and can include a range of decision-making approaches. 
 
Zone 5: low certainty-low agreement. This is the most difficult area where everyone disagrees 
and no one has a clear answer. Evidence is very poor or limited and may be continually shifting. 
Moreover, the issue may be highly emotive and politicised effectively nullifying evidence-
based strategies. Here, incremental steps are important, and intuitive responses may be just as 
important as evidence-led thinking. 
 
Using the modified Stacey diagram, we can now visualise the position of the drafters’ role in the 
legislative process.  
 
 




As we see in Figure 2, the position of the drafters is one that cuts across a range of zones. On 
the one hand, much of the day-to-day work of drafters is relatively stable and repetitive. The core actors 
in the system are largely stable (public servants on long-term contracts, and repeatedly engaged 
independent contractors). There is a clear structure of legislative processes, traditional styles and 
cultures for drafting legislation and detailed procedural norms. Aspects such as these fall within Zone 
1. Orderly, bureaucratic processes function well in this zone. Detailed data on these processes can be 
accumulated and analysed, and evidence-based improvements can be implemented; evidence-based 
techno-rational decision-making is the optimum tactic. The pursuit of clarity in this zone should be 
achievable, at least as regards agreement on meaning between drafters and the main group to whom the 
legislation is addressed, because of the high degree of stability and predictability found in this zone. 
 
However, the drafters’ role is clearly not that simple. Even given a high degree of certainty over 
the cause/nature of a particular issue (for example, pollution in urban areas, obesity), the various 
stakeholders involved will generally have very different interpretations and responses to it. Hence, the 
pursuit of clarity and simplicity are evidently problematic in this context. In these Zone 2 areas, 
groups/interests may be militantly opposed to each other for a mix of interest-based, social or 
ideological reasons. More data, evidence, or technical analysis will have little impact in finding 
solutions in this Zone because the differences are qualitative. Here, drafters must take account of 
political nuance and bargaining and reflect this in their work. 
 
At the same time, drafters may be confronting issues that have substantial public 
agreement/support behind them (traffic reduction, public health initiatives, security measures) but that 
are technically challenging, and could be implemented via a range of possible solutions. Greater 
evidence and data may help. However, different technologies and approaches could be used to lead to 
a variety of improved outcomes; for example, encouraging more public transport versus increasing 
bicycle lanes; promoting more sports versus healthy eating campaigns; putting more police ‘on the 
streets’ versus targeted policing. Hence, in Zone 3, drafters will need to call upon the leading experts, 
but in the end will have to rely on discretionary decision making, guided by their political instructors.  
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In drafting the legislation, should they suggest that ministers endorse language which pins down a single 
implementation methodology for clarity and (relative) simplicity in the short term, or should they 
delegate greater discretion to the civil servants and junior ministers tasked with implementing the 
policy?  The former option is good for the rule of law, those subject to the rules should know what the 
situation is, and the public know that the minister is democratically responsible for the implementation 
method selected.  The latter option has the potential to be more responsive to unforeseen eventualities.  
However, it lacks the democratic and rule of law credentials of the former approach because the 
parameters of the powers granted, and thus the lines of accountability, are less clear. 
 
Zone 4 is the most common zone for legislative decision-making, where complex issues 
involving a multitude of actors with different interests, facing a range of technical difficulties and 
uncertainty (tax issues, business regulation, drug regulation) require a variety of complex decision-
making processes. Data collection and evidence-based decision-making can be useful, but so are 
political skills and discretionary decision-making based on a range of technical expertise. The 
instructions received by the drafter will ask them to balance these various factors and actors as best as 
she can, to produce compromises that can never be perfectly optimised, but which may be stable and 
satisficing.125  Again, the Zone 4 context is not conducive to the types of clarity and simplicity proposed 
by the PL/GL discourse. Nevertheless, the involvement of multiple actors, including the public, may 
make the principled basis of the legal rule which permits balancing action plainer to a wider range of 
people, improving the accessibility of, and legitimacy of the law. 
 
Finally, occasionally drafters are forced towards issues in Zone 5, the zone of greatest 
uncertainty and disagreement. Examples include the need to rapidly respond to large scale events 
(Brexit, Trump) and moments of national crisis (unprecedented disasters – human or natural) and highly 
divisive issues where simple technical answers are unavailable (edge of life decisions, issues of large 
scale racial and ethnic hatred). In this zone, data and evidence are only marginally useful, trying to 
                                                 
125 n 4 above. 
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manage these situations is like ‘walking through a maze whose walls rearrange themselves with every 
step you take’.126 Incrementalism may be the best approach, but it is still very uncertain due to potential 
‘butterfly effects’, the unforeseen, unintended, and nonlinear consequences of decisions.127 Often the 
best one can do is fall back on experience, trial and error, and intuition.  The law required to authorise 
such an approach will struggle to deploy the prescriptive language available for Zone 1 challenges, and 
must place a higher degree of trust in political accountability mechanisms outwith the law.  It involves 
a high degree of discretion being accorded to front-line decision-makers while asking political 
representatives abstracted from those decisions to accept political responsibility for perceived ‘failures’ 
of policy.  Given the nature of the problems legislative actors face in Zone 5, the law is likely to fall 
back on more flexible concepts to assess legality that judge the behaviour of decision-makers on 
whether it was reasonable or proportionate in that context,128 which poses constitutional questions 
regarding the proper remit of judicial action.129 
 
The tendency towards disorder in complex systems 
As noted at the beginning of this article, human complex systems are interconnected with, and open to, 
a multitude of other systems and their larger environment. Hence, they are fundamentally dissipative, 
continually requiring new energy, inputs, and adjustments to adapt, thrive and meet their wants and 
needs in an incessantly evolving, interconnected network of systems. Within this setting of constant 
change and adaptation, there is a persistent tendency towards disorder and obsolescence. For example, 
privacy laws designed to deal with the era of print media are clearly inadequate to respond to the 
changing dynamics of privacy in the internet age in the same way that traditional financial regulation 
                                                 
126 J. Gleick, Chaos (London: Sphere Publishers, 1987), 24. 
127 L. Pal, ‘Assessing Incrementalism: Formative Assumptions, Contemporary Realities’ (2011) 30(1) Policy and 
Society 29. 
128 Likely much closer to proportionality as articulated in Kennedy v Charity Commission [2014] UKSC 20 and 
Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19 than the unreasonableness threshold of 
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. 
129 For example, see M. Arden, ‘Proportionality: The way ahead?’ [2013] Public Law 498, 513-516; T. Hickman, 
‘Problems for Proportionality’ [2010] New Zealand Law Review 303; cf P.P. Craig, ‘The nature of reasonableness 
review’ (2013) 66(1) Current Legal Problems 131, 140-142. 
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has been slow to deal with the rise of crypto-currencies. Fundamentally, and similar in operation to the 
concept of entropy where all systems eventually tend towards disorder without new inputs,130 all social 
systems, rules, and structures must be continually renewed and revised in order for them to have a 
chance to adapt, survive and satisfy the wants and needs of their constituents. Renewal is essential, but 
it does not guarantee the success or survival of a social system. Practical examples of the failure of 
system renewal and the tendency towards disorder can be seen in the extreme cases of state and societal 
breakdown in the face of civil war and internecine conflict, or when overly rigid political systems 
actively inhibit societal adaptation and renewal.131 Visually, this can be captured by the Stacey diagram 
in the following way. 
 
 
Figure 3: The Tendency Towards Disorder 
 
                                                 
130 R.L. Flood and E.R. Carson, Dealing with complexity: An introduction to the theory and application of system 
science (London: Plenum Press, 1988), 13-14; Geyer and Rihani n 7 above, 17.  
131 Webb, n 22 above, 239. 
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If this is recognised as a reasonable approximation of the decision-making reality for drafters, 
then the implications for drafters resemble those for policy-makers discussed above. Similarly, as was 
also noted above, one of the driving tendencies in the post-WWII era was a push towards greater 
certainty and ‘evidence-based’ order in public policy, often held up as the gold standard to which all 
policy actors should strive.132 Moreover, as our review of recent PL/GL initiatives shows, this desire 
for greater clarity, simplification and accessibility continues. On the one hand, these are healthy 
responses to the underlying tendency of all complex policies and societies to drift towards disorder and 
reflect the continued development and complexity of the law and legislative process which inevitably 
requires clarification and simplification. On the other hand, there are also reflections of this tendency 
towards, and beliefs in greater order and control which hold that, with enough evidence, expertise, and 
effort, a ‘perfected’ policy or legal system can be created. This belief in, and desire for some form of 
‘end state/final order’ is often the contested territory occupied by populist movements and a mask for 
powerful stakeholder interests. With these concerns in mind, what does the Stacey Diagram complexity 
analysis reveal about the implications of PL/GL initiatives?  
 
The implications for PL/GL Thinking 
As noted earlier, one of the main foci for PL/GL drafters is to ‘clarify’ the law. This move towards 
greater clarity is associated with a range of positive outcomes for policy and law. It would enable them 
to be more precisely applied by experts and used by lay people, reduce uncertainty by limiting the range 
of reasonable judicial interpretation, and through these achievements increase respect for law and the 
policy process in society at large. 
 
We do not dispute that these are potential outcomes of greater clarity. However, even if these benefits 
were all possible, as demonstrated in Figure 4, clarity comes at the cost of increasingly politicised 
discretionary decision-making.  
                                                 





Figure 4: The Implications of Clarification 
 
With this in mind, if we return to the list of benefits of clarification, it is not difficult to see that 
each has an underlying political element. For example, greater precision implies that there would be 
much clearer winners and losers, exacerbating political tensions in any particular policy area. Similarly, 
an increased ability to deploy the law by non-experts broadens the range of actors and groups that could 
easily engage in the drafting process.  While this increase in input possibilities is both potentially 
invigorating to the system, and democratically attractive, we need to think about how the system will 
accommodate this diversity in a way that maintains its legitimacy while containing political and, later, 
legal disputes as to the constitutionally acceptable modes of resolving them; judicial review, free and 
fair elections based on universal suffrage, protest and free speech. Meanwhile, reducing the scope for 
judicial interpretation could significantly amplify the political pressure on the drafting process to lock 
down definitions and anticipate disputes. Finally, it is clearly problematic to conclude that greater clarity 
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and, by implication, politicisation of the drafters’ context would lead to a greater respect for the drafting 
process or its products. 
 
Likewise, as demonstrated in Figure 5, below, the strategy of ‘simplification’ creates similar 
contradictions. Proponents of legislative simplification argue that similar benefits to clarification could 
be created such as reducing the volume of legislation, simplifying the language used, agreeing to core 
rules and structures when drafting legislation, and reducing the effort and cost for the public to comply 
with the law. 
 
 
Figure 5: The Implications of Simplification 
 
In essence, simplification seeks to lessen the complicatedness of the drafting process and its 
outputs such that there is a greater level of public understanding and agreement over what the policy or 
legal rule is. However, as noted in Figure 5, even if this attempt at using simplicity to increase public 
agreement about the legislative drafting process and its outputs did work, it would immediately increase 
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the level of technical uncertainty surrounding it. For example, if the volume of legislation was reduced, 
and simpler, less technical language used, this would merely transfer the more complicated and complex 
aspects of any policy issues towards the policy implementers (civil service, local government), to the 
less scrutinised arena of secondary legislation, or the judiciary as normal societal complexity began to 
interact with the simplified rules. This would have the effect of requiring civil servants implementing 
policy, and the judiciary adjudicating upon the appropriateness of that implementation, to make overtly 
political judgments about how to resolve the types of disagreement that, constitutionally, are best dealt 
with at the legislative stage.  A similar outcome would arise if rigid rules regarding the types of 
terminology, length, and style of legislation were implemented.  Simplification does not remove 
technical uncertainty or political disagreement from law, it merely moves it outside of the legislative 
process.  This has interesting political implications particularly in relation to who gains most from 
simplicity which generates a lack of clarity, and who is best placed to use the wider legal system to 
protect their interpretation of ambiguous, simplified legislation. 
 
The combined drive for greater clarity and simplicity in recent PL/GL initiatives clearly 
parallels aforementioned, NPM and evidence-based policy initiatives to create more rational, stable and 
orderly policy outcomes that can be based on the gold standard of policy making – Zone 1 techno-





Figure 6: Plain/Good Law and the Stacey Diagram 
 
From a complexity perspective, as illustrated by the Stacey diagram, given the dominant orderly 
framework of policy-making in the rational ‘Westminster’ model, it is no surprise that legislative 
drafters, and proposals surrounding the drafting process, are continually attracted to strategies aimed at 
pushing the process into the more orderly zone of techno-rational decision-making. The pursuit of 
simplicity, clarity and, partly as a consequence of these efforts, accessibility, facilitate this.  If, as is the 
implication of the PL/GL movement, there is always a better – clearer, simpler – version of the text to 
be written, and a better way of allowing public and specialist users to access that text, then the 
proponents of PL/GL are essentially saying that they can convert the art of drafting into a techno-
rational science.  In essence, the art of balancing mixed stakeholder requirements articulated through 
potentially contradictory ministerial instructions can be converted into a scientific methodology. 
 
Articulated in this way, it seems unlikely that drafters would wish to pursue the clarificatory, 
simplifying and accessibility mantra of the PL/GL movement to the bitter end.  Nonetheless, as 
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recognised by complexity thinking, due to the continuing tendency towards policy disorder over time, 
in some respects efforts towards greater simplicity and clarity are essential in keeping the drafting, 
policy and legal process in a healthy, balanced state. This is because the on-going, reflexive re-
examination of the operation of the legislative process, and its relationship to the socio-legal context in 
which it operates, is an essential aspect of maintaining relevance and legitimacy to that context.  The 
exact position of this ‘balanced state’ will vary over time and in relation to local, national, regional and 
international contexts. Hence, the pursuit of a final end state of ‘good law’ is a fundamentally flawed 
and potentially dangerous concept, if pursued too vigorously, on too narrow a methodological, 
epistemological, and ontological basis. PL/GL initiatives are part of a continuing balancing process and, 
to a degree, are an indication of a healthy and robust response of drafters and policy and legal actors 
against the tendency towards disorder. The danger results from the belief that PL/GL processes can 
produce answers that deal perfectly with competing, contradictory, politicised positions. 
 
Conclusion 
Returning to the five main questions that we outlined in the beginning of this article, the problem of 
complicatedness and complexity in law and legislative drafting is not new, and variations on this 
problem and attempts to respond to it are centuries-old. In their more pragmatic guises, the current 
PL/GL initiatives are merely the latest form of this historical process and they reflect new technologies 
(internet, search engines, computerisation), new policy frameworks (NPM, evidence-based policy 
making), distinctive legal cultures (common, civil, multi-jural), and a range of specific political and 
social dynamics. As we argue above, we are not fundamentally opposed to these initiatives. In fact, they 
are an essential part of the necessary renewal and revitalisation that all social systems must manage 
when confronting the inevitable change and disorder that life entails. Our concerns are focused on the 
tendency of these initiatives to fall into the hubristic trap of certainty and a belief in an underlying order 
to society, and hence the law. As we have shown, those working towards clarification, simplification 
and accessibility of statute law often appear to be seeking an unattainable goal - a means of reducing, 
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perhaps eliminating, what are essentially political disagreements about the terminology and structure of 
a text, such that agreement over the technical understanding of that text can be arrived at.   
 
Following this, in response to question Three, we do not think that complicatedness or 
complexity is the core problem for law, policy or drafters. It is an inherent part of the process. Learning 
how to recognise and manage it is of primary importance. Creating a balanced drafting system that 
combines elements of structure and openness that fits with the relevant political and social contexts is 
one of the greatest drafting skills of all, hence our use of the term the ‘drafters dance’. It is an art form 
which combines knowledge, skill, nuance, experience, intuition and a range of decision-making 
strategies. This does not mean that more complexity will improve the process. Boundaries, structures 
professional norms, and historical processes are essential to the maintenance of any social system. 
However, since most of the PL/GL initiatives are focused on creating more order in the legislative 
process and system, and downplaying or ignoring the various tensions, we are forced to emphasize the 
problems and threats that come from an overreliance or hubristic belief in order. As we mentioned 
earlier, this has been a dominant tendency in policy making in much of the 20th and early 21st centuries. 
 
On the other hand, it would be a mistake to reason that because complexity theory is deeply 
sceptical of final answers to socio-legal questions, we should abandon the attempt to accommodate 
novelty.  This is not our point.  Instead, as the example of the statutory drafter demonstrates, we argue 
that there will always be new versions of these challenges to deal with.  The risk of rigidly pursuing the 
particular conception of the principled, but potentially misguided goals of clarification, simplification 
and increased accessibility of the law followed by the PL/GL movement is that such an approach 
naturally anticipates an end to these intractable problems. 
 
Regarding Questions Four and Five, from a complexity perspective, ‘plain’ and ‘good’ laws 
are not necessarily better than ‘normal’ complex ones. Again, we support the general position that laws 
should be as clear, simple and accessible as possible. However, clarity, simplicity and accessibility all 
come with various trade-offs and are not inherently better than more complicated and complex laws or 
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policies. If law is required to be complicated, such that one would quite reasonably be concerned that 
the ordinary lay person, or indeed specialist non-lawyer, would struggle to grasp the meaning of the law 
to them at first glance, then we need to think about the accessibility of legal advice.  The requirements 
society imposes on the law – in particular that the law is sufficiently rigorous as to allow it to be 
observed and enforced as intended – should not yield to the goal of simplifying and clarifying the law 
for lay people if this ultimately harms the interests of those very same people; for example, by 
weakening environmental protections or food safety standards.  Moreover, as was evident in most of 
the examples that we explored, PL/GL initiatives are often focused on the needs of business and can be 
used as a cloak for de-regulatory political agendas that other stakeholders (consumers, workers, etc.) 
would be strongly opposed to, or certainly would wish to actively consent to before they were advanced. 
Hence, claims that simple laws are inherently beneficial and somehow less political than ‘normal’ 
complex laws are clearly overstated, perhaps even disingenuous. 
 
Finally, returning to the metaphor of the drafters’ dance, drafters are an important part of a 
delicate legislative and legal process. There are a wide range of institutional structures, historical 
traditions, and structured relationships that set the stage of the dance. There are also many legal, policy, 
and political ‘partners’ interacting with the drafters, often pulling them in contradictory directions. 
Drafters are not in control of the location, tempo, or rhythm of their system, but they do have agency 
and play an essential role in the shaping of the style and staging of law and policy. PL/GL initiatives, 
even when well-intended, seem to imply that the dance can be made easier, simpler, and produce a 
better outcome. Given our complexity perspective, we fundamentally disagree with this assumption. In 
fact, we fear that, in addition to acting as a cloak for certain political groups, it unnecessarily constrains 
drafters, legislators, and the law in responding to the normal complexity of everyday life. This limits 
the adaptability, flexibility, and viability of the legal system and legislative process, and could lead to 
a distancing of the law and legislative process from the very people that PL/GL initiatives claim to be 
interested in connecting with. It also implies that, if drafters follow certain core rules regarding clarity, 
simplicity, and accessibility, then their work will be improved. When linked to quantitative indicators 
(formatting guides, word totals, readability indicators) this has the ability to make drafters more 
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accountable (do they follow the target indicators or not?) but undermines their fundamental 
constitutional responsibility to the legal and policy outcomes that they are instructed to enable. This 
tendency towards accountability but not responsibility is echoed throughout the current rationalist, 
evidence-based, and target-oriented, dehumanised policy framework where the child was lost, the 
patient died, or the system crashed, but procedures were followed, and targets met.133 Our hope is to 
encourage drafters to avoid this and keep dancing! 
                                                 
133 n 4 above. 
